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PATENT POLICY AND PREEMPTION: THE
STIFFEL AND COMPCO CASES
JAMES M. TREECEj-
N January 1956, the Stiffel Company, a manufacturer of lamps for
home use, added to its merchandise line a pole lamp-a decorative
tube extending from floor to ceiling, held in place by a compression
spring at one end, and having lamp fixtures along the outside. Soon
after, Stiffel Company applied to the federal government for a mechani-
cal patent and a design patent on this lamp. In August 1956, Sears,
Roebuck and Company contracted with its supplier for lamps which
were exact copies of Stiffel's pole lamp and which were marketed with-
out identifying markings. The Sears copy retailed at roughly the
wholesale price of its rival.
After receiving mechanical and design patents on its lamp, Stiffel
sued for patent infringement and unfair competition. The district
court ruled that both patents were invalid because they were anticipated
by and lacked invention over the prior art, but held that Sears, in
making a substantially exact copy of the Stiffel product, was guilty of
unfair competition under Illinois law. The court enjoined Sears from
thereafter selling or attempting to sell pole lamps identical to or con-
fusingly similar to Stiffel's lamp.1
The Seventh Circuit affirmed,2 noting that the Sears and Stiffel lamps
"have a remarkable sameness of appearance"3 and that the finding
below that Sear's copying caused "customer confusion" was intended
to refer to confusion as to "the source of the lamps" and was not clearly
erroneous.
4
The Supreme Court, in two opinions by Mr. Justice Black, reversed
the Seventh Circuit without dissent in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffet
Co.,5 and its companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.6
- Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
1 The district court's judgment was rendered on January 22, 1962; its findings of fact
and conclusions of law are unreported. The foregoing statement of facts was taken
from Petitioner's Brief, Respondent's Brief and Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2 Stiffel Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 225
(1964).
s Id. at 118.
4 Id. at 118, nn.6, 7.
5 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
6 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The defendant in the Cornpco case copied a lighting reflector
on a fluorescent lighting fixture marketed by plaintiff, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. Day-
Brite sued for design patent infringement and unfair competition. The same district
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The opinion in Stiffel first stated that Congress was expressly empowered
by the Constitution to make provisions for patents and copyrights, 7 and
then inferred from the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over
patents and copyrights that Congress intended a policy of national uni-
formity to prevail.8 But, the opinion continued, even if Congress has
not by legislation denied to the states the power to regulate directly
or indirectly in the sphere of Congress' competence under the patent
clause of the Constitution, the supremacy clause requires that even state
law evolved in the exercise of undoubted state power must fall if it
comes in conflict with valid federal law or policy. In short, if Illinois
law was applied in the case at hand to suspend rights insured by the
federal patent laws, then the application could not stand even if within
Illinois' power absent the conflict.
Conflict was found, since federal patent law was regarded as granting
the public a right to make any article first made by another if the article
cannot qualify for patent protection for lack of invention or if the
limited period of patent protection has expired. By preventing copying,
Illinois law limited a right conferred on the public by federal law.
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to
prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight an
advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block
off from the public something which federal law has said be-
longs to the public. The result would be that while federal law
grants only 14 or 17 years' protection to genuine inventions...
States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking
in novelty to merit any patent at all under federal Constitu-
tional standards. This would be too great an encroachment
on the federal patent system to be tolerated.0
Had the Court secured to Stiffel and Day-Brite an exclusive right in
their product configurations, it would have created a source of economic
court which decided the Stiffel case held that the design patent was invalid but en-joined Compco Corporation from unfairly competing with the patentee by the sale of
identical or nearly similar reflectors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, saying, "The capacity
of the plaintiff's design to serve the plaintiff in somewhat the manner of a trademark
does constitute a 'protectable' right." 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 234
(1964). The record in this was slightly stronger on the point of confusion about source
than was the record in the Stiffel case, but not significantly stronger. In Stiffel there
was no evidence that anyone who cared was confused about source by Sears' copying,
while in Compco there was evidence of some confusion about source in the trade, a
type of confusion which is legally insignificant according to general principles of unfair
competition law. Classifying the cases as indistinguishable on their records seems
reasonable.
7 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964).
8 Id. at 231, n.7.
9 376 U.S. 225, 231-32.
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power in them,' 0 by allowing them to escape competition from identical
products. 1 For example, Stiffel Company's control over supply and
price, as the only seller of particular types of pole lamps, would be
limited only by the willingness of consumers to substitute other types of
lamps.' 2 The Court thus declined to protect a theoretically anti-com-
petitive means of product differentiation.13 But some commentators pro-
test that the competitive mechanism requires encouraging sellers to
differentiate their products. 14 Unless consumers can distinguish com-
peting goods, it is argued, factors inducing consumer preference cannot
be isolated.15
The policy announced by the Court struck a balance between the
opposing views.16 While it is reasonable to assume that one way con-
sumers could identify Stiffel's pole lamp before Sears entered the
market was by its design and over-all appearance, and while it seems
clear that the certainty of that means of source identification was re-
duced materially when the Court sustained Sears' right to copy, it is
indisputably clear that these decisions did not free competitors to copy
all means of product differentiation. In the words of the Court:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require
that goods whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that
other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from
'being misled as to the source, just as it may protect businesses
in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in
the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating
such markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of
the goods.17
10 See, e.g., BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 115-16 (1956). Cf. Cohen, Tran-
scendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 816 (1935).
11 Cf. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1943)
(Frank, J.).
12 See Olson & McFarland, The Restoration of Pure Monopoly and the Concept of
Industry, 76 Q.J. ECON. 613, 620-22 (1962).
13 See McConnell & Peterson, Diversification and Differentiation in Small Manufac-
turing Firms: An Empirical Study, Q. R.v. ECON. & Bus., Spring 1964, pp. 29-31.
14 Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REv. 967 (1952).
As to the modes of differentiating products, see generally CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTC COMPETITION 56 (7th ed. 1956); Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and
Public Policy, 40 AM. EcoN. Rsv. 85, 86 (Pt. 2 1950).
15 See Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of .Trademarks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 180-82 (1949).
16 See Greenhut, Free Entry and the Trade Mark-Trade Name Protection, 24 So.
EcoN. J. 170, 178-81 (1957), for an interesting proposal regarding the standard to be
employed by courts in balancing the desirability of protecting means by which con-
sumers identify source against the desirability of unfettering competitors in their efforts
to encroach upon first comers' immunities from competitive forces.
17 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
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The incapacity of Illinois law to protect the Day-Brite and Stiffel
product configurations was grounded upon federal preemption. The
extent to which this preemption theory will affect areas previously
regarded as within the competence of the states may turn in part upon
whether the disability is viewed as imposed by negative implications
from the patent clause or by the operation of the supremacy clause
upon situations where state law conflicts with the federal statutory
patent policy.
The patent clause empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries."' 8 Authority for implying from this grant of power an exclusion
of state competence is perhaps limited to Learned Hand's much dis-
cussed dissent in Capital Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.,19
where Hand was speaking only of "writings" and not "discoveries."
Even there, Hand's thesis was a narrow one: that the limited times
phrase prevents a state from granting a perpetual monopoly in a pub-
lished work. But as has been well noted by Kalodner and Vance,20 a
theory of constitutional preemption is not without difficulties. To suggest
that the constitutional phrase prohibits state protection of "unpublished"
works defies well-established principles of common law copyright. Yet
nowhere in the language of the phrase is there a reason for distin-
guishing federal preemption of published works from unpublished
works. Indeed, the distinction based upon publication is one based upon
use, not time, and the policy expressed by the constitutional language
is that of protection for "limited times" without- reference to use. Fur-
thermore, once the limited times phrase is regarded as restricting state
power, similar logic would seem to require interpreting the terms
"writings," "authors," "inventors" and "discoveries" as limitations on
state power.
The question of state competence in the patent field came up early
in connection with grants by New York of "patent" rights in steamboat
transportation to potential and actual inventors. The question of the
compatibility of the New York grant with the patent power of the federal
18 U.S. CONsT., Art. I, § 8.
19 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting). See Kaplan, Performer's
Right and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 69 HARV. L. REv. 409 (1956); Kaplan,
Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 469 (1955); Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection
of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1079 (1959); Note, 68 HAav. L. REV.
349 (1954); Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1960).
20 Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of Literary
and Artistic Property, 72 HARv. L. R-v. 1079, 1082-84 (1959).
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government was not reached by Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,2 1 but
in the earlier state case, Livingston v. Van Inger,22 the same issues were
presented and resolved in favor of state competence.
A state cannot take away from an individual his patent right,
and render it common to all the citizens. This would contra-
vene the Act of Congress, and would be, therefore, unlawful.
But if an author or inventor, instead of resorting to the Act of
Congress, should apply instead to the Legislature of this state
for an exclusive right to his production, I see nothing to hinder
the State from granting it, and the operation of the grant
would, of course, be confined to the limits of this State. Within
our own jurisdiction, it would be complete and perfect. So a
patentee under the Act of Congress may have the time of his
monopoly extended by the legislature of any state, beyond the
term.., allowed by that law. Congress may secure for a limited
time an exclusive right throughout the Union; but there is
nothing in the Constitution to take away from the states the
power to enlarge the privilege within their respective jurisdic-
tions.23
Thus, the argument that the patent clause is a grant of exclusive
power to Congress, preempting state law, has the burden of adverse
precedent to sustain. But a similar result may be reached through the
operation of the supremacy clause in instances where state law conflicts
with the patent policy expressed in federal legislation.
Justice Black's invocation of federal patent policy to avoid state
unfair competition law is not without precedent, although the earlier
cases did not use the language of preemption. In Coats v. Merric Thread
Co.,24 plaintiff sued to enjoin defendant for trademark infringement
and unfair competition in simulating the labels and symbols used by
the plaintiff upon the ends of wooden sewing spools. In 1870 plaintiff's
assignor had obtained a design patent for the design embossing the end
of the sewing spool. The patent expired in 1877, but prior to that time
plaintiff registered as a trademark matter which was part of the subject
matter of the patent. The Court conceded that "irrespective of the
technical question of trade-mark, the defendants have no right to dress
their goods up in such a manner as to deceive an intending purchaser
and induce him to believe he is buying those of the plaintiff."25 The
21 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
22 9 N.Y. 507 (1812).
23 Id. at 581 (opinion of Kent, C.J.). Kent's opinion was described as entitled to great
weight in Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 508%09 (1878).
24 149 U.S. 562 (1893). See Holzapfel's Compositions Co. v. Rahtjen's American
Composition Co., 183 U.S. 1 (1901).
25 149 U.S. at 566.
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Court nevertheless ruled that "plaintiff's right to the use of the embossed
periphery expired with their patent, and the public had the same right
to make use of it as if it had never been patented."26 The inference is
plain that the Court considered the patent monopoly as an exception
to a general policy of competition, and that promotion of the arts and
sciences would best be served by permitting only a conditional monop-
oly, the benefits of which would ultimately inure to the public.
This rationale was made explicit in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. 2 7
It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the monop-
oly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing
formerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is
upon this condition that the patent is granted. It follows, as a
matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there
passes to the public the right to make the machine in the form
in which it was constructed during the patent.28
These cases, and similar decisions in the lower courts,29 although not
explicitly invoking federal preemption, foreshadowed the Compco and
Stiffel decisions by setting forth a federal policy of freedom to use
product features that was restricted only by the limited monopoly deemed
necessary to "promote the arts and sciences," and the duty to identify
competing products.30
Federal-state accommodation in the area of copyright perhaps suggests
a similar policy. The first dictum one meets in investigating the rela-
tionship of common law copyright to statutory copyright is that they
are mutually exclusive. While a persuasive case can be made that no
question is more open than whether a statutory copyright operates to
26 149 U.S. at 572.
27 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
28 Id. at 185.
29 See West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Manners Jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La.
1960).
g0 A similar policy -may perhaps be found in Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488 (1942). There an action was brought in equity for patent infringement
and the defense was interposed that the plaintiff by requiring purchasers of its patented
machine to use its unpatented articles in operating the machines had restrained sale of
the unpatented articles in violation of the Clayton Act. The Court affirmed dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds of the public interest in competition which it said were
found in a strict limitation of the patent grant; this conclusion enabled the Court to
avoid deciding whether the Clayton Act had been violated. Strictly read, however, the
opinion deals only with the limitation upon equity powers imposed by the public
interest and it does not reach the question of whether federal policy requires preemp-
tion of state power. See also Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
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divest a party of his common law right,3 ' it is nevertheless generally
conceded that rightly or wrongly, American law is settled that the
common law right is extinguished when the federal one is applicable.
Thus, in Holmes v. Hurst,32 the Supreme Court said, "it seems now to be
considered the settled law of this country and England that the right
of an author to a monopoly of his publications is measured and deter-
mined by the copyright act-in other words, that while a right did exist
by common law, it has been superseded by statute."33
The federal act is thus seen as pre-empting state law, but only par-
tially, for the state common law copyright theoretically retains vitality
for the period prior to the time statutory protection becomes available.
34
This federal pre-emption begins when publication occurs.35 Thus pub-
lication of a copyrightable work without complying with the statutory
formalities places the work in the public domain. In addition, publica-
tion of a work which is not copyrightable under the federal act but
which is a writing within the meaning of the Constitution, and thus
within Congress' reach under the patent clause, is seen as a forfeiture
of the common law copyright in the work.3 6 Finally, publication of
matter which has insufficient attributes to meet the Constitutional
standard of "writings" 37 is also said to dedicate the common law right
in such matter.3 8 Under copyright principles, therefore, the Day-Brite
and Stiffel configurations would have been dedicated to the public at
publication and, subject to possible federal protection, made free to the
public.39
31 See Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry into the Constitu-
tional Distribution of Powers Over the Law of Literary Property in the United States,
9 COPYRIGHT Soc. BuLL. 102, 105-10, 194 (1962).
32 174 U.S. 82, 85 (1899).
33 Ibid.
34 That common law copyright protection of unpublished works is available is made
explicit in § 2 of the present Copyright Act. 61 Stat. 654 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
35 G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); National Comics Pub-
lications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951), clarified, 198 F.2d
927 (2d Cir. 1952); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1940),
aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
36 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940). But cf. Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
37 Common examples are time cards, diaries, report forms, graph paper, account
books, checks, score cards, order forms, vouchers, etc. See LATMAN, HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT
LAW 38 (rev. ed. 1962).
38 G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
39 The suggestion that the Stiffel pole lamp might have been eligible for copyright
protection is not too extreme, for both "writings" and "author" have been construed
liberally. An author is essentially one who creates a work without copying. See Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951), while writings include
statuettes used as lamp bases in lamps sold for home use, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
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The copyright practice seems roughly similar to what the Court in
Compco and Stiffel said was required by patent policy in design patent
cases. The Court ruled that state protection was precluded by the possi-
bility of federal protection and that matter, upon becoming eligible for
such protection, fell into the public domain, subject to any statutory
rights received by the owner or inventor.
Similarly the subject matter of a patent grant is assumed to become
part of the public domain at the time of the grant,40 and matter
ineligible for patent protection 4 ' because exploited as a trade secret, 42
or disclosed but not claimed in a patent application,4 3 is regarded as in
the public domain from the time of first public use. Thus, in Compco
and Stiffel, where the configurations were the very matter claimed as
protected by the grant, the federal policy of relying on dedication "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts" quite clearly applied.
The configurations in Compco and Stiffel were dedicated to the public
use by the grant of design patent protection, subject to a limitation on
the public right during the life of the grant-a limitation terminated
by the district court in both cases.
Federal policy thus seems to require at the least that all exploited
"writings" and "discoveries" find protection under the federal statute
or go unprotected,44 yet in the past commercially exploited works have
received some protection from common law copyright principles.
State competence to define publication has not been successfully chal-
lenged.45 By indulging in fictions, states have protected some commer-
(1954), textile fabrics used in dresses, Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274
F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960), and junk jewelry, Boucher v. Du Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958). See also Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thrifticheck
Serv. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Gresco Jewelry Co.,
204 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 308 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1962).
40 Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938).
41 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829).
42 Ibid. See Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Elec. Co., 246 Fed. 695 (6th Cir.
1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 659 (1918).
43 Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra note 40.
44 The proposed revised Copyright Act is in accord with this policy. Section 19
provides that "all rights in the nature of copyright in works that come within the sub-
ject matter of copyright as specified by sections 1 and 2, . . . whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title." The states are expressly forbidden
to grant equivalent protection. But § 19(b) saves state power to protect rights "that are
not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright" as
defined by the act, and "deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false rep-
resentation" are enumerated as being within the scope of state competence. S. 3008,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. July 20, 1964.
45 Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (L.
Hand, J., dissenting).
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cially exploited works.4 6 In Ferris v. Frohman,47 the Supreme Court
recognized that the public performance of a play, no matter how often
given or how great the number of viewers, is not such a publication of
the play as to deprive the owner of his common law right to protection
against appropriation by others. Later, in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station, Inc.,48 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the sale
,of large numbers of phonograph records to the public with an express
notice that the use of records purchased was "not licensed for radio
broadcast" was not such a publication as would give the public a right
to use the records so restricted in a radio broadcast. And in Metropolitan
Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,4 9 the New York state
courts held that the performance of an opera in an opera house and its
broadcast over a radio network did not constitute such a publication as
forfeited the plaintiff's rights in the performance, and defendant was
enjoined from recording the broadcast and making and selling phono-
graph records from the recording. More recently, in Ettore v. Philco
Television Broadcasting Corp.,5o the Third Circuit, applying the law of
four states, held that in each state a plaintiff who performed in a boxing
match with heavyweight champion Joe Louis in 1936 and who sold his
movie rights in the "performance" nevertheless retained a right to ex-
clude others from later showing film clips of the fight on television.
Boxer Ettore, though consenting that all might see his fight either in the
arena or on film, nevertheless was said to have retained a property right
in his performance which was not dedicated to the public.
Perhaps the best explanation of this manipulation -of the concept of
publication is that the courts have been willing to indulge the states
in order to avoid the inadequacies of the federal copyright scheme.51
46 "[T]he courts apply different tests of publication depending on whether plaintiff
is claiming protection because he did not publish and hence has a common law claim
of infringement, in which case the distribution must be quite large to constitute 'pub-
lication'--or whether he is claiming under the copyright statute-in which case the
requirements for publication are quite narrow. In each case the courts appear so to
treat the concept of publication as to prevent piracy." American Visuals Corp. v.
Holland, 239 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.). See Kaplan, Publication in Copyright
Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 479-84 (1955), and
Kalodner 9- Vance, supra note 20, at 1093-95.
47 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912). See Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp.
356 (D. Mass. 1934), modified, 81 F.2d 373 (lst Cir. 1936).
48 327 Pa. 433, 194 Ad. 631 (1937).
49 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
50 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956). See also Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d
443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956).
51 See Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records,
103 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 488 (1955); Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1960).
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But the thrust of Compco and Stiffel seems to imply that the question
of divestitive publication is to be controlled by federal law.52 Cornpco
and Stiffel seem dearly to require that in cases where a state definition
of publication conflicts with the federal copyright scheme, the state
definition must give way; to allow the states to define publication, even
in areas arguably not conflicting with the federal copyright policy, would
produce the anomalous result of permitting a state definition in some
cases while precluding it in others.
The question not reached by the patent dedication decisions, and
involved in Compco and Stiffel, was whether matter which failed to
qualify for protection under the federal statutes could be protected
by the states. While the artificiality of the publication concept in the
common law copyright cases suggests otherwise, the copyright cases are
theoretically consistent with the patent policy of dedication. In extend-
ing the policy announced in the early patent dedication cases-that
freedom of product use would be limited only when necessary to effec-
tuate the federal policy of promoting science and the useful arts or when
necessary to prevent fraud by requiring product identification-to matter
failing to qualify for federal protection, Compco and Stiffel did little to
articulate what state regulation might not be regarded as in conflict with
the federal scheme.
In Sperry v. Florida53 the Supreme Court held that Florida was pre-
empted from regulating the activities of a non-lawyer licensed by a
federal agency to practice before the patent office, even though that
person's activities amounted to the practice of law in Florida, where he
was not licensed. The Court reasoned that establishing a patent office
was clearly within Congress' express constitutional power to grant patents
and that authorizing competent persons to assist in the administration
of that office did not exceed what was necessary and proper. Florida,
therefore, could not forbid as the unauthorized practice of the law what
Congress had validly authorized under its patent power.
But that decision did not hold that the federal government had pre-
empted the regulation of the unauthorized practice of law, nor did it
hold that the patent agent involved could practice law in Florida,
without being subject to Florida regulations, other than by preparing
patent applications. Cornpco and Stifiel are analogous. Although holding
that state unfair competition law cannot grant protection which con-
flicts with federal patent policy, the Court did not require pre-emption
of all state protection.
The Supreme Court has often recognized the power of a state to
52 See note 44 supra.
53 273 U.S. 379 (1963).
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regulate the plane of competition by prohibiting fraud 54 and that which
is deemed unfair,55 and by legislating under the police power.56
State unfair competition law has been the source of protection for
many forms of product differentiation ranging from configurations to
trademarks and tradenames.57 The federal courts, in hearing cases in
unfair competition under their pendent jurisdiction,58 have assumed
unfair competition doctrine to be a matter of state law.59 Consequently,
the results in Compco and Stiffel suggest that pre-emption was invoked
by the Court as the only means available to federal courts to arrest
certain developments in state unfair competition law; the decisions can
be explained as being consistent with traditional notions of protection
against "passing off," while impliedly rejecting the "misappropriation"
theory and extension of technical trademark protection to cases of
product simulation.
Traditional unfair competition doctrine confers judicial protection
upon product configurations not protected by a patent or a copyright
only when the configuration is a source symbol to a substantial number
of consumers in the relevant market.6 0 Only when consumers identify
the nonfunctional features of a product with a particular source will
unfair competition doctrine prevent a competitor from copying those
features, and benefiting from the resultant consumer confusion. The
standard was set forth in strict terms by Learned Hand in Crescent
54 See Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 855 (1906).
55 See Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942); Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1935); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1938). See
also Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
56 "[T]he right conferred upon the patentee . . . to use and vend . . . must be
exercised in subordination to the police regulations which the state . . . established."
Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 505 (1878).
57 See generally Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1940); Rahl,
The Right to "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 56 (1962); Stem & Hoffman,
Public Injury and the Public Interest: Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Com-
petition, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 935 (1962); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts,
77 HARv. L. REv. 888 (1964); Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair
Competition, 68 HARV. L. REv. 814 (1955); Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 520 (1964); Note, 73
YALE L.J. 389 (1964); Comment, 29 U. CO. L. REv. 371 (1962).
58 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958).
59 E.g., Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956). The
Ninth Circuit is contra. Neal v. Thomas Organ Co., 325 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1963); Bliss
v. Gotham Industries, Inc., 316 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Federal-Mogul-Bower
Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963) (federal remedy for unfair com-
petition in 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
60 E.g., Zippo Mfg. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See
authorities cited supra note 57.
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Tool v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.61 "The plaintiff . . . [must] . . .show
that the appearance of his wares has in fact come to mean that some
particular person ...makes them, and that the public cares who does
make them, and not merely for their appearance and general structure."' 2
In short, this aspect of unfair competition doctrine recognizes that other-
wise unprotected features of goods should be free to competitors, but
restrains that freedom when necessary to protect the source associations
of consumers.
The law of source symbols, whether marks or configurations, can be
found in the first trademark case decided by the Supreme Court, Dela-
ware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark.6 3 The question in that case was
whether the plaintiff had an exclusive right to use the words "Lacka-
wanna Coal" to designate coal mined by plaintiff and transported over
its railroad to market. The Court refused to find mark rights in what
it regarded as a term geographically descriptive of the product to which
it was applied. It acknowledged that rights in trademarks were unlike
rights in things protected by patent or copyrights in that words and
symbols in common use-in the public domain-could be adopted and
an exclusive right in their use as a mark obtained, because marks in
themselves had no utility other than to give notice who was the producer
of a particular article. There were limitations, the court noted, in that
"no one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trademark or
trade name which would practically give him a monopoly in the sale
of any goods other than those produced or made by himself. If he could,
the public would be injured rather than protected, for competition
would be destroyed." 64 Otherwise, said the court, if a mark does not have
this latter quality and does indicate origin, it will be protected against
appropriation by a competitor, on the theory that in a competitive
economy no man has a right to sell his goods as another's.
The teaching of that opinion can be illustrated in a series of examples.
A and B are competitors. C enters A's store. A offers C article X telling
him B is the source, and C buys. Assume C never heard of B and did
not care about source. B has a cause of action against A for passing off
A's product as B's.65
Suppose a similar set of facts. A and B are competitors. B marks his
product with a Z in such a way that the Z qualifies as a technical trade-
61 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
62 Id. at 300.
63 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1872). See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878); Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
64 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1872).
65 Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 214 (1837).
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mark. C enters A's store and buys an article X marked with a Z. Article
X was made by A. A said nothing to C. C never heard of B and never
saw the mark Z. B has a cause of action against A for passing off A's
product as B's.66 If B wishes, he may refer to A's conduct as either passing
off or trademark infringement.
Take another case. A and B are competitors. B begins selling his
product in pinch bottles. A is at once attracted by the package and puts
up his product in a pinch bottle. C enters A's store and buys product X
in a pinch bottle. Product X was made by A. B has no cause of action
against A. A has not passed off his product as B's because he neither
said A's product is B's nor used B's technical trademark on A's product,
which in the law is the same as saying A's product is B's. 67 A merely
copied B's marketing scheme using a bottle configuration which was in
the public domain.
Now, vary the last case. A and B are competitors. B has sold his
product in a pinch bottle for many years with the result that a large
percentage of consumers identify a desired source by the pinch bottle
in which a product is marketed. C walks into A's store and buys product
X, packaged in a pinch bottle. Product X was made by A. B has a cause
of action against A for passing off A's product as B's.68 Although B may
have to complain about A's unfair competition rather than A's passing
off, the case is similar to the first and second hypotheticals. By con-
fronting C with product X in a pinch bottle, A was in effect saying "B
made this," just as if he mouthed the words or used B's technical trade-
mark.
Suppose that, in the last example, instead of a pinch bottle what was
involved was the shape of the product itself, and suppose that the shape
contributed to the usefulness of the product. Assume that the shape had
been used exclusively by B in such a way that it became a source symbol.
B will be unable to gain effective relief against A, for here B is claiming
protection for the exclusive use of a source symbol which would, in the
terms of the first Supreme Court trademark pronouncement, give him a
monopoly in the sale of particular utilitarian features. 69
In the latter case state trademark law, or more broadly, unfair com-
petition law, would refuse to treat as a trademark a use of features of
goods which would confer rights like patent rights.70 And this is what
66 Dean v. Steel, Latch 188, 82 Eng. Rep. 339 (K.B. 1625); Southern v. How, Popharn
143, 144, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243, 1244 (K.B. 1617).
67 Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H. G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1962).
68 J. N. Collins Co. v. F. M. Paist Co., 14 F.2d 614 (E.D. Pa. 1926).
69 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
70 State unfair competition law has always excluded from protection on unfair corn-
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* happened in Compco and Stiffel, except that the fixture configurations
involved were not in fact performing a trademark function, and except
that federal law rather than state law was invoked to refuse protection
to the fixtures.
Although the appellate court in Stiffel sought to interpret the trial
court's findings of customer confusion as referring to the source of the
lamps, 71 it seems clear that the district court did no more than find that
the Sears lamp was confusingly similar in appearance to the Stiffel lamp.
That consumers would confuse the two products does not suggest that
consumers associated either lamp with a particular source, a necessary
finding under traditional theory.
Similarly, the plaintiff did not show nor did the lower courts find a
protectable source symbol in the Compco case. The district court did
not find that buyers associated the reflector design with Daybrite as a
source. It was only found that the design had the capacity to identify
Daybrite to the trade and did in fact so identify plaintiff, and that the
reflectors were confusingly similar.72 But it is existing consumer source
associations that are given preference in unfair competition, not distrib-
utor's associations or future consumer's associations. The mental proc-
esses of persons who are not consumers,7 of persons who are not in the
market,74 and of persons who are not in the relevant market7 5 have all
been held to be improper measures of whether a particular feature is a
source symbol. Only the source associations of consumers in the market
place take precedence over a manufacturer's right to copy anything not
protected by one of the statutory monopolies. Concern for the source
associations of people in the trade cannot override the consumer's right
to the benefits of competition. Accordingly, as a matter of unfair com-
petition law, Compco and Stiffel are consistent with traditional theories
controlling "passing off"-no consumer source associations were found
petition features of goods which were functional according to state law. See Speedry
Prods., Inc. v. Dri Mark Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1959).
71 Stiffel Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 n.6 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376
U.S. 225 (1964).
72 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 38-39, Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Apparently the only evidence on the issue of
source association was testimony of the employees of the parties who generally described
the contested reflector design as distinctive. Brief for Petitioner, p. 15, Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., supra.
73 O'Day Corp. v. Talman Corp., 310 F.2d 623, 625 (lst Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 977 (1963).
74 Airstream Trailers, Inc. v. Cayo, 221 F. Supp. 557, 558 (D.W. Mich. 1963).
75 American Luggage Works, Inc. v. U.S. Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1957),
aff'd sub. nom. Hawley Prods. Co. v. U.S. Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69 (Ist Cir. 1958). See
Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. Alexander Flasher Corp., 137 U.S.P.Q. 205 (D. Mass. 1963).
1964]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
to be present and the products' features were not found to be non-
utilitarian.
The "misappropriation" cases, usually thought to add a new dimen-
sion to the law of unfair competition, can be regarded as in conflict with
the Compco and Stiffel results. These cases have given protection to a
variety of types of "intellectual property" against appropriating com-
petitors despite the absence of patent, copyright or trademark protec-
tion. The most famous is the Associated Press case, 76 decided as a matter
of federal common law prior to Erie v. Tompkins. 77 The Supreme Court,
while assuming that Associated Press had no property interest in un-
copyrighted news matter published in newspapers or posted on bulletin
boards, held it could nevertheless exclude International News Service
from using those sources for news which INS distributed as its own while
operating a rival service. The Court's opinion was cast in sweeping
language, reasoning that INS should be enjoined, not because it had
copied plaintiffs product, but because it had taken something that was
the product of plaintiff's "labor, skill and money." Read liberally, the
logic supports protection against any competition by similar products
where it can be shown that the originator has invested something of
value in the development of his product.
Although never overruled, the precedent value of Associated Press
today is doubtful. In Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 78 the Supreme
Court was asked to protect the pillow-shaped form for a shredded wheat
biscuit against use by a rival cereal manufacturer. It refused, saying that
the precise form of the biscuit was dedicated to the public by the ter-
mination of plaintiff's patents. National Biscuit Co. alleged unfair
competition on a theory reminiscent of the previously decided Asso-
ciated Press case. The Court's reasoning was dear. Since the expiration
of the patent monopoly conferred upon the public the right to make
the thing formerly covered by the patent, no party may assert exclusive
rights in that subject matter.79 The only duty of the defendant was "to
identify its product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff." 0 In
language seemingly directed to the Associated Press opinion, although
not citing it, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant had
unfairly appropriated plaintiff's work product.
76 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Cf. Reichel-
derfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932); The Fire-Extinguisher Case, 21 Fed. 40 (C.C.D.
Md. 1884).
77 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
78 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
79 Id. at 120.
80 Ibid.
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Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the
article known as "Shredded Wheat"; and thus is sharing in a
market which was created by the skill and judgment of plain-
tiffs predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expendi-
tures in advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair.
Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or
trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in
the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply inter-
ested.8 '
Kellogg may easily be read as strictly limiting the theory of Associated
Press. Although since Erie the Supreme Court is theoretically incapable
of expressly overruling Associated Press, Kellogg and other indications of
disapproval 82 suggested that the "misappropriation" rationale was to be
severely restricted. Compco and Stiffel can be regarded as marking the
doctrine's final demise.
But some infusion of the misappropriation theory can be detected in
cases decided ostensibly on traditional unfair competition groundsss
by courts desiring to avoid the requirement of source association, but
reluctant to rest their decision expressly upon misappropriation doc-
trine.S4
Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co.85 and Mastercrafters Clock & Radio
Co. v. Valcheron & Constant-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.86 are illustrative.
The facts resemble the Associated Press situation. In Flint the court
enjoined defendant's sale of a mustard seed charm substantially similar
to plaintiff's. In Mastercrafters, the court enjoined the dock and radio
81 305 U.S. at 122.
82 E.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281
U.S. 728 (1930). In Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
312 U.S. 457 (1941), the Court stated that the principles declared in Associated Press
could not legalize a combination which violated the Sherman Act. The question there
was whether an association of -members of the garment industry could resort to self
help in order to reduce competition presented by pirated dress designs. The Court
found the combination illegal and refused to consider whether the alleged practices
sought to be eliminated were tortious, contending that even if the pirating were
tortious it could not justify the combination. Thus, the Court did not expressly dis-
avow the misappropriation theory of Associated Press, but by refusing to allow that
case to be used in defense of an anti-trust action the Court indicated that a policy of
competition was the paramount interest to be preserved. Cf. Millinery Creator's Guild
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
83 See Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 1908);
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 Fed. 37 (2d Cir. 1907); Enterprise Mfg. Co. v.
Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 Fed. 240 (2d Cir. 1904).
84 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, (7th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 234 (1964), is an excellent example.
85 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
86 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955).
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company from distributing clocks similar in appearance to those dis-
tribute by Valcheron. Although both results seemingly depend upon
a "misappropriation" theory, the decisions were based instead upon
findings of customer and non-customer confusion or the probability of
such confusion. These and other recent unfair competition decisions, 87
like the misappropriation cases, assume that the probable confusion
resulting from product similarity encroaches upon a public interest
important enough to justify conferring a monopoly power upon the
originator without reference to consumer source associations.88 Compco
and Stiffel will certainly retard such developments.
Compco and Stiffel portend an even more direct impact upon state
law. The decisions teach that certain product features, like pole lamp
configurations, are protectable only under the federal statutes or not at
all, without regard to possible source associations. In terms of traditional
unfair competition doctrine, whether certain product features are func-
tional and therefore unprotectable even as source symbols is now a
matter of federal policy.8 9 Unfortunately, the Compco and Stiffel deci-
sions themselves offer scant assistance in defining "federal functionality."
Thus the decisions in Compco and Stiffel can be read as a return to
traditional principles of unfair competition law.9 0 The policy announced
in the early patent cases of freedom to use product features otherwise
unprotected by patent, copyright or trademark law was reaffirmed. By
expressly recognizing the state interest in promoting product identifica-
tion, Compco and Stiffel saved to the states their traditional area ot
competence; but by resting on preemption grounds, the decisions ensured
that state protection could not be the basis for acquiring monopoly
powers similar to those conferred by the federal statutes.
87 E.g., Mercury Record Corp. v. Buckingham Record Co., 226 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 934 (1962).
88 Cf. the development in the law of trademarks and tradenames. Comment, 29
U. CHr. L. Rxv. 371 (1962); Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 520 (1964). The Court in Stiffel
suggested that the analogy from trademark and tradename protection to cases of prod-
uct simulation may have been hasty. 376 U.S. at 227 n.2 (1964). For a possible basis of
distinguishing the trademark and tradename cases, see Note, 73 YALE L.J. 389 (1964)
(discussing the Compco and Stiffel decisions in the Seventh Circuit).
89 The minimum aspects of functionality would be defined by federal policy, but
state law would not, of course, be precluded from enlarging the definition to embrace
more than is required by federal law.
90 See Note, 73 YALE L.J. 389 (1964).
